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INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2004, eight State Attorneys General and the City of
New York brought suit in federal district court in the Southern
District of New York, seeking to adjudicate the issue of global
warming as a public nuisance. Six large electric power producers
were named as defendants. The complaint filed in Connecticut v.
American Electric Power Co.,1 as the action is styled, alleges that
emissions of greenhouse gases from the defendants' plants, in
particular carbon dioxide (C02), are contributing to global
warming. Count I claims that these greenhouse gas emissions are
* Charles Keller Beekman Professor, Columbia Law School. An earlier version of this
article was presented at the symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in National
Environmental Policy, at Columbia Law School, September 20, 2004, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
351. The article could not have been brought to fruition without the able assistance of
Thomas Richardson and Vivian Mills, or without the gentle but persistent prodding of all
three of us by Kevin Meier Kertesz.
1. No. 04 Civ. 5669, 2004 WL 1685122 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 21, 2004); or No. 04- cv-05569-
LAP, complaint filed (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2004).
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an actionable public nuisance governed by federal common law.2
This count, if it states a cause of action, should establish subject
matter jurisdiction in the federal district court, based on the
presence of a federal question. Count II pleads, apparently in the
alternative, that the emissions are an actionable public nuisance
under state nuisance law.4 Subject matter jurisdiction over this
count is based on supplemental federal jurisdiction.5 Under both
counts, the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief directing the defendants
to abate their emissions of greenhouse gases; there is no demand
for damages.
The use of litigation to establish environmental policy is not new.
It has featured prominently in the history of American public law,
and has produced results that are mixed, or at least controversial.
I leave for another day the question whether, as a policy matter, it is
a good idea to ask the courts to resolve issues like global climate
change. Rather, my focus here is on some of the challenging legal
questions raised by the suit. In particular, I will discuss four
questions: (1) whether State AGs have standing to bring such a suit;
(2) whether such a suit is in fact governed by federal common law,
as opposed to state common law; (3) whether the suit is impliedly
preempted by the commitment of foreign policy to the political
branches of the federal government; and (4) what substantive legal
standard of nuisance liability should govern the suit. I will discuss
some of the factors that either will or should bear on the resolution
of these questions, and speculate a bit on the likely response by the
courts.
I. STANDING
A critical threshold question raised by the suit is standing. There
are some fairly ordinary standing issues here, as well as some more
esoteric ones. I am more interested in the esoteric issues, but in
order to get to those we must pass first through the more ordinary
2. Id. at 164.
3. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100, 105 (1972) (Milwaukee I).
4. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 2004 WL 1685122, 166-186.
5. Id at 36.
6. For case studies of the often unintended consequences of public law litigation, see, e.g.,
R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act (1983);John M.
Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation: How Overregulation Causes
Underregulation at OSHA (1988).
[Vol. 30:2
Global Warming As A Public Nuisance
ones.
A. Ordinary Standing Principles
Let us begin by assuming that ordinary standing principles - as
developed by the Supreme Court in the context of civil litigation
filed by private citizens - are fully applicable to this case. That is,
assume the suit was brought not by state AGs, but by private citizens
concerned about global warming, against the same six electric
utility defendants. Such a suit would undoubtedly encounter a
motion to dismiss on standing grounds. The motion would likely
cite four reasons why such citizen-plaintiffs do not have standing to
challenge the emission of greenhouse gases as a public nuisance:
the citizens cannot establish that they have suffered injury in fact;
they cannot show that any injury they have suffered has been
caused by the defendants' emissions; the relief they seek would not
redress the injury of which they complain; and their suit asserts
generalized grievances shared by all citizens.
Consider first injury in fact. The complaint cites a number of
injuries - to public health, coastal resources, water supplies, the
Great Lakes, agriculture, ecosystems, forests, fisheries and wildlife,
from wildfires, from catastrophic storms. Nearly all of these are
injuries that the complaint alleges "will be caused ''7 "are
threatened,"8 "will increase" 9 or are "likely to result"'° as a result of
global warming. They are, in short, injuries that might happen in
the future. There is, of course, no reason to ignore a problem,
especially one that might be very serious, just because it might
happen in the future. But the Supreme Court has held that federal
courts can adjudicate only actual injuries," and concluded in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife12 that this means injuries that are either
presently existing or "imminent."'3 Specifically, the Court in that
case held that animal biologists could not challenge the destruction
of habitats of animals they had studied in the past, because they
could not show that they had plans to resume their studies in the
7. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 2004 WL 1685122, 110.
8. Id. at 116, 133, 134.
9. Id. at 106, 111,113, 119,120, 130, 131,140, 141.
10. Id. at 122.
11. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984).
12. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
13. Id. at 560.
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near future. 14
The utility defendants in my hypothesized citizens' suit would
almost certainly argue that the injuries apprehended to come
about because of global warming are likewise insufficiently
imminent to allow an Article III court to adjudicate the legality of
global climate change. Those injuries have not yet materialized,
may not materialize for many decades, and conceivably will not
materialize at all."5  The Supreme Court has been far from
consistent in its treatment of allegations of future injury. 6 But
there is a good chance the defendants would prevail on this point.
The citizens in my hypothesized suit would undoubtedly try to
take solace from a post-Lujan decision, Friends of Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,'7 in which the Court upheld the
standing of citizen plaintiffs who had a "reasonable" apprehension
that they might suffer injury from certain discharges of pollution.' 8
The "apprehension" in Friends of Earth, however, was of injuries
that would directly flow from exposure to existing discharges that
were plainly illegal under the permitting system of the Clean Water
14. Id. at 564.
15. See National Research Council, Committee on the Science of Climate Change,
Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions, 1 (2001), available at
http://books.nap.edu/html/climatechange/climatechange.pdf. ("Because there is
considerable uncertainty in current understanding of how the climate system varies naturally
and reacts to emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols, current estimates of the magnitude
of future warming should be regarded as tentative and subject to future adjustments (either
upward or downward); See also, NASA Fact Sheet, The Greenhouse Effect, at
http://www.gsfc.nasa.gov/gsfc/service/gallery/fact-sheets/earthsci/green.htm (June, 1993)
("there has been little increase [in temperature] in the last 50 years, which raises questions
about whether we really have experienced the effect of increasing C02. The pattern of
changing global temperatures suggests that there may be other factors influencing climate.
There is also the possibility that the sensitivity to greenhouse gases is less than what most
climate models indicate. Scientists feel an increase of ldegree F ( 0.5 degrees C) in 140 years
is not necessarily outside the range of natural climate variability.").
16. Compare United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (organization of law students has standing to challenge rate
order on the ground that it may produce greater litter in parks in the future), Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (citizen group has standing to
challenge cap on liability of nuclear power plant operators on ground that it may increase
risk of a future reactor accident) , with Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871
(1990) (environmental group has no standing to challenge reclassification of land that may
lead to future mining activity); Lyons v. Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (arrestees subject to
police choke hold have no standing to challenge department's practices on the ground that
they may be arrested again in the future).
17. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
18. Id. at 183-85.
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Act.'9 Such an "apprehension" has an objective basis in law and
fact. Here, in contrast, the claim is of apprehension of future
injury from discharges of C02, the effects of which remain
uncertain, and which are lawful under current regulatory law.20
Courts are unlikely to find actual or imminent injury quite so easily
in this context.
Causation poses a second standing problem. The Supreme
Court has said that citizen-plaintiffs lack standing if they cannot
show that the alleged injury of which they complain was caused by
the illegality they seek redress. The defendants will argue that they
are responsible for a small portion of the world's greenhouse gas
emissions, so small that it cannot fairly be said that they are "the
cause" of global climate change. According to the data in the
complaint, the power plants operated by the six defendants
produce 10% of total U.S. C02 emissions.2 It is estimated that the
U.S. produces 25% of global greenhouse gases.2 So the entire
operations of all six defendants are responsible at most for 2.5% of
the world's greenhouse gases. This makes it difficult to say that
they are in any sense the cause of the problem.
The citizens might respond that even if the defendants are only
fractionally responsible for an indivisible harm that others are also
creating, this should not insulate the defendants from
accountability for the portion of harm that is in fact attributable to
their conduct. For example, consider a suit by a group of
insurance companies to recover the costs they have incurred from
paying the medical expenses of smokers. Should the action be
dismissed against a small tobacco company, such as Liggett &
Meyers, because its products comprise only 2.5% of the market? At
least in a suit for damages, where liability for an indivisible harm
might be apportioned among multiple actors based on some
formula (like market share) ,23 it is doubtful that a court would
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
20. In fact, the Bush Administration has taken the position that EPA has no legal
authority under the Clean Air Act to regulation emissions of greenhouse gases. See infra note
111.
21. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 2004 WL 1685122, 2.
22. See Environmental Information Administration, Greenhouse Gases, Climate Change,
and Energy, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapterl.html (last modified
April 2 2004) ("the U.S. produces about 25 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions from
burning fossil fuels.").
23. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 994 F.2d 112, 123-24 (3d Cir.
1993) ("Under the theory of market share liability, tortious manufacturers who produce a
2005]
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dismiss the action for want of standing simply because of the
defendant's small market share. Perhaps in a suit seeking an
injunction, relief would be denied in such a case on grounds of
equity. But this goes to the conditions for awarding relief, not
standing. So perhaps the citizens would escape dismissal of their
suit on causation grounds.
The third ground for objecting to standing - redressability - is
related to but distinct from causation. The redressability
requirement asks whether the relief sought by the plaintiffs is likely
to cure the injury of which they complain.24 Here, I think the
objection based on the defendant's small share of global
greenhouse gases poses a more serious problem, precisely because
it focuses on the nexus between injury and relief rather than injury
and conduct. Even if the defendants' C02 discharges were
declared illegal and completely enjoined, it is most doubtful that
this would end the injuries threatened to flow from global
warming. Granting the injunction the plaintiffs seek - which would
phase out the defendants' emissions over time - would not even
put a dent in the inexorable rise in world temperatures caused by
the long-term accumulation of greenhouse gases. It would thus
appear that the defendants would have a better chance of winning
on redressability.
A fourth standing problem in my hypothesized citizen suit would
be that the plaintiffs are asserting a generalized grievance shared by
all citizens.25  It is currently unclear whether the rule that
generalized grievances do not confer standing is a part of the
understanding of what "injury in fact" means, or whether it is
simply a prudential limitation which can be waived by Congress. 6
But even if this is a prudential limitation, a suit grounded in federal
common law, almost by definition, is not one that benefits from a
special statutory right of action enacted by Congress. So the
generalized grievance limitation is fully applicable here.
Most of the injuries alleged in the complaint - including threats
from new diseases, violent storms, wildfires, and injury to
ecosystems - implicate all members of society. The defendants
fungible identifiable product that injures the plaintiff are held liable in proportion to their
respective market shares.").
24. SeeAllen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173-74 (1974).
26. Federal Election Com'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998).
[Vol. 30:2
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would surely claim that these grievances are not particularized to
individual plaintiffs, and hence run afoul of the prohibition on
generalized grievances. Whether the defendants would prevail on
this claim is uncertain. Dictum in a recent Supreme Court decision
suggests that "a widespread mass tort" would not run afoul of the
generalized grievances rule, 27 and this arguably characterizes global
warming. Moreover, the plaintiffs could argue that some of the
injuries of which they complain, such as injuries to agriculture or
coastal properties, apply to subsets of the population, and hence do
not qualify as generalized grievances. So the argument based on
generalized grievances would be less clearly a barrier to standing
than the arguments based on injury in fact and redressability. Still,
it would be a nontrivial problem for the hypothetical citizen
plaintiffs, and might provide an independent basis for dismissing at
least the majority of their claims.
In short, if this were a citizens' suit, the defendants would mount
a substantial threshold defense based on standing. The ultimate
resolution of this defense is uncertain, and would turn in
significant part on the evidentiary support that the parties could
muster through supporting affidavits or other testimony. But it is
safe to say that the defense would be a serious one, with significant
support in existing authority.
B. Parens Patriae Standing
The more interesting question raised by Connecticut v. American
Electric Power is whether these general standing limitations should
apply in a parens patriae suit brought by state AGs based on public
nuisance law. The Supreme Court's restrictive standing law has
been developed almost entirely in the context of citizen suits.28 The
AGs will want to argue that these restrictions do not apply to
actions brought by public officials seeking to vindicate the general
public interest. Whether they are right is a complicated question
that leads us into largely uncharted territory.
Let us start with some basic propositions. The Court has never
held that the body of standing rules developed in the context of
27. See id. at 24.
28. See, for example, the Court's discussion of constitutional and prudential requirements
of standing and the specific cases cited illustrating each requirement in Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-
82 (1982).
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private actions applies ex proprio vigore to actions brought by public
• 29 • 3
officials. Consider in this regard a criminal prosecution. In what
sense can it be said that the government, in prosecuting a crime, is
seeking to vindicate some injury in fact, or that a conviction will
redress that injury, or that a crime (some crime at least, like
victimless crime) is not a generalized grievance of all members of
society? One could attempt to squeeze criminal prosecutions into
the Court's standing doctrine by declaring that the injury is to the
government's "sovereign interest" in enforcement of the law.3 ' But
it is far more straightforward to revert to first principles, and just
say that criminal trials brought by the government were a familiar
part of the 'judicial power" exercised by courts when the
Constitution was established. In other words, criminal
prosecutions fall squarely within the class of "cases and
controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to and resolved by
the judicial process. 3
The example of criminal prosecutions suggests that the "cases"
and "controversies" that make up the judicial power conferred by
Article III include not just private actions seeking vindication of
private rights - which must satisfy the Court's elaborate standing
doctrine and other limits on justiciability - but also certain public
actions brought by public authorities, which have never been
thought to be restricted by such doctrines. The prosecution of
crime is the paradigmatic example of such a public action by public
officials. A U.S. Attorney authorized by law to bring a federal
29. Cf. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 133-34 (1995) (denying standing to Director of
worker's compensation board to seek judicial review of decision of Benefits Review Board,
but stating in dictum that "Congress could have conferred standing on the Director without
infringing Article III of the Constitution.").
30. See Edward A. Harnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show
that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2239
(1999).
31. Cf. Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771
(2000) (stating in dictum that violation of the law is an "injury to its sovereignty" sufficient to
support "a criminal lawsuit by the Government").
32. As Justice Frankfurter once put it, the question should be whether "judicial
determination is consonant with what was, generally speaking, the business of the Colonial
courts and the courts of Westminister when the Constitution was framed." Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (concurring opinion).
33. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). On the
historical roots of standing doctrine, see Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat
Standing Doctrine?, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 689 (2004).
[Vol. 30:2
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criminal prosecution has never been, nor should be, required to
demonstrate that the United States has suffered injury in fact, or
that the crime caused this injury, or that a conviction will redress
such an injury, or that the crime is not a generalized grievance.
Public nuisance suits brought by government officials are the civil
analogue of criminal prosecutions. Public nuisance actions often
apply to conduct that is also subject criminal prosecution, like
maintaining a house of prostitution, or a gambling den, or
blocking a public street or poisoning the public water supply.34 If
the judicial power includes the ability to hear criminal actions
brought by public officials without regard to whether standing
requirements are satisfied, then there would seem to be little
reason why the judicial power should not also extend to public
nuisance actions brought by public officials seeking to vindicate
public rights without regard to whether standing requirements are
satisfied.3'5 The AGs therefore can argue that public nuisance
actions brought by public officials, like public prosecutions of
crimes, fall outside the area of concern about private citizen
standing that has given rise to the Court's restrictive standing
jurisprudence.
Here, however, two further complications potentially enter. One
is the longstanding understanding that the Constitution prohibits
federal courts from entertaining prosecutions based on common
36law crimes. This authority renders it doubtful that the U.S.
Attorney General or any other federal officer can be said to have
authority to bring an action in federal court based on the federal
common law of public nuisance. The same considerations of
separation of powers and federalism that counsel against
recognition of federal common law crimes would also counsel
against recognition of a federal common law of nuisance.37 This
objection, however, arguably goes more to the legitimacy of the
34. W. Prosser, Law of Torts 583-585 (4" ed. 1971).
35. This helps explain why public nuisance suits brought by public officials, unlike such
suits brought by private individuals, do not require any demonstration of "special injury." See
David R. Hodas, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Law Citizen Suits for Relief from
Environmental Harm, 16 Ecology L. Q. 883 (1989). The special injury requirement is the
common law's version of the modern law of standing for citizen suits.
36. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); United States
v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
37. For elaboration on the separation of powers and federalism objections to federal
common law, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Power of Federal Courts, 52 U Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 12-24 (1985).
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federal common law of nuisance (the topic of the next Part) than
to the standing of federal officers to bring such actions in federal
court. If federal common law crimes were permitted, there can be
little doubt that federal officers would have standing to prosecute
such crimes - without regard to whether the ordinary standing
limitations developed in private action could be said to be
satisfied.38
The second complication is whether the officers of one political
sovereign can bring an action like a public nuisance suit in the
courts of another sovereign. Historically speaking, it was
understood that "the courts of no country will execute the penal
laws of another."39 This carried over to American federalism, in the
form of the understanding that public actions brought by public
officers must be brought in the courts of the sovereign in whose
name the action is brought.4° Thus, federal criminal prosecutions
are brought in federal courts, state criminal prosecutions are
brought in state court; federal civil enforcement actions -
forfeitures and the like - are brought in federal court, state civil
enforcement actions in state court. Indeed, as a matter of
historical practice, nearly all public nuisance actions brought by
state officials like AGs have been brought in state court.
4
1
Various functional justifications can be advanced in support of a
general design principle requiring executive officials to assert their
sovereign authority in their own court system, rather than in the
courts of another sovereign. Accountability is one. Courts exercise
broad discretionary powers in public actions like criminal
prosecutions and public nuisance suits, and public officials, often
elected, serve as gatekeepers in deciding whether to bring such
actions. If public officials could bring these actions in the courts of
another sovereign, the lines of accountability would be blurred.
Expertise is another. Having one court system hear all public
actions brought by the sovereign brings a measure of expertise and
38. See Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy Champion for Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The United States
in Parens Patriae, 92 Nw. U.L. Rev. 111, 135-48 (1997).
39. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 481 (1923).
40. See generally, Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 Va. L. Rev. 387,
397-447 (1995).
41. See, e.g., Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special
Injury Rule, 28 Ecology L.Q. 755, 889 n.664 ("typical public nuisance cases rill be brought in
state court"); Gwyn Goodson Timms, Statutorily Awarding Attorneys' Fees in Environmental
Nuisance Suits:Jump Starting the Public Watch Dog, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1733, 1756 (1992) ("Public
nuisance suits are usually brought in state court").
[Vol. 30:2
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stability that would be lacking if public officials were allowed to
switch back and forth among court systems in bringing public
actions.42
For better or worse, however, it is almost certainly too late in the
day to advance any general rule that public nuisance actions, like
criminal actions, must always be brought in the courts of the
sovereign that institutes the action. Beginning with Missouri v
Illinois43 in 1901, the Supreme Court has on numerous occasions
permitted state AGs to bring public nuisance actions directly in the
Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction. These cases have
typically involved public nuisances with transboundary effects,
often some form of pollution emanating in State A that is alleged
to cause harm in State B.44 The Court has analogized these suits to
disputes between independent sovereign nations.' Independent
sovereign nations faced with such a transboundary public nuisance
would have recourse to diplomacy or perhaps war to resolve their
dispute. These remedies being foreclosed under the Constitution,
the Court has said, the alternative is an original suit in the Supreme
Court.46
The Court has more recently sought to restate the principle of
the transboundary nuisance cases by referring to the standing of
states to sue as parens patriae in federal court.47  Parens patriae, the
42. This is similar to a justification given for having all cases of a specific type brought
before specialized courts set up to deal with those cases. See Richard B. Saphire, Shoring Up
Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U.L. Rev. 85, 123 n.237
(1988) ("Congress has created specialized article III tribunals, like the Court of Claims, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and the Court of International Trade, in part because
of its concern for expertise.").
43. 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
44. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (flooding); New York v. NewJersey,
256 U.S. 296 (1921) (water pollution); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1907) (air pollution in Georgia caused by discharge of noxious gases from the defendant's
plant in Tennessee); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (diversion of water), Missouri
v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (sought to enjoin defendants from discharging sewage in such
a way as to pollute the Mississippi river in Missouri).
45. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
46. Id. at 241 ("If Missouri were an independent and sovereign state all must admit that
she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and
the right to make war having been surrendered to the general government, it was to be
expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy and that
remedy, we think, is found in the constitutional provisions we are considering.").
47. For an overview, see Kenneth Juan Figueroa, Note, Immigrants and the Civil Rights
Regime: Parens Patriae Standing, Foreign Governments and Protection from Private Discrimination,
102 Colum. L. Rev. 408, 433-44 (2002).
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Court has admitted, "is a judicial construct that does not lend itself
to a simple or exact definition."4  It does not refer to a State's
purely sovereign interests, such as the "power to create and enforce
a legal code, both civil and criminal" or to demand "recognition
from other sovereigns. 4 9 Nor does it refer to a State's action as the
legal representative of persons who are incapable of representing
themselves.50 Nor does it refer to the State's pursuit of "proprietary
interests," such as the ownership of property or the pursuit of
business interests. 5 Rather, it refers to the State's assertion of
"quasi-sovereign" interests.52 The Court has declined to give this
vague term a precise definition, but has made clear that the State's
interest in protecting the health and wellbeing of its citizens from
transboundary nuisances is the paradigm case of a quasi-sovereign
interest that will support parens patriae standing.
What the Court has not made clear is whether State AGs who
bring parens patriae public nuisance suits in federal court are subject
to the same standing rules as apply to citizen suits, or whether they
are exempt from such limitations by analogy to public actions filed
by public officers in the courts of their own sovereign. The Court's
leading decision on parens patrie standing seems to assume that
such suits are subject to ordinary rules of standing, cautioning that
such suits "must be sufficiently concrete to create an actual
controversy between the State and the defendant" and must
"survive the standing requirements of Article III.'5 3 But the issue
has never been squarely decided.
I suggest resolving the confusion over the standing requirements
for parens patriae actions by adopting the following rule: Parens
patriae suits should be exempt from the standing limitations that
apply to citizen suits when public officers sue in the courts of their
own sovereign, by analogy to the implied exemption from standing
requirements for criminal prosecutions filed by public officers in
their own courts. But when public officers bring parens patniae
48. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
49. Id.
50. As the Court has acknowledged, this was the common law definition of parens
partiae. Id. at 600.
51. Id. at 601-02.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 602. Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion in Snapp in which he argued
that "[a]t the very least, the prerogative of a State to bring suits in federal court should be
commensurate with the ability of private organizations." Id. at 611. Private organizations, of
course, are subject to the standing rules that govern private citizen suits.
[Vol. 30:2
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actions in the courts of some other sovereign, they should be
subject to the same Article III and prudential standing limitations
that apply to suits by aggrieved citizens. This rule would seek to
accommodate two principles otherwise in some tension with one
another: first, the general design principle that public officers
should ordinarily bring public actions in their own courts, 4 and
second, the widespread practice of allowing State AGs to sue as
parens patriae in the federal courts, particularly when necessary to
vindicate a State's interest in protecting its citizens against
55transboundary pollution. The accommodation would mean,
insofar as Article III is concerned, that the 'judicial power" would
be understood to extend to all public actions brought by
authorized officers of the federal government, without regard to
whether traditional standing limits are met. But the 'judicial
power" would extend to actions brought in federal court by state
officials only if they satisfy the ordinary standing limitations that
would apply to citizen suits. State officials could satisfy these
limitations either by showing that the State itself has suffered some
injury in fact from the challenged action, or by suing in a
representational capacity and showing that the State's citizens have
suffered some injury in fact from the challenged action.
This reconciliation has a neat and tidy quality to it, but
encounters one rather substantial historical problem: There is no
suggestion from the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction cases
adjudicating transboundary nuisance disputes - the paradigm for
the modern parens patriae action - that the States bringing these
suits were required to meet any particular standing burden in order
to maintain the action.56 One could attempt to distinguish these
cases on the grounds that today's elaborate standing doctrine,
requiring injury in fact, causation, redressability and so forth, is a
54. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 232 (1901) ("The rule that the courts of no country
execute the penal laws of another applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes
and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the state for the recovery of pecuniary penalties
for any violation of statutes for the protection of its revenue, or other municipal laws, and to
all judgments for such penalties.").
55. See Kenneth Juan Figueroa, Note, Immigrants and the Civil Rights Regime: Parens Patriae
Standing, Foreign Governments and the Protection from Private Discrimination, 102 Colum. L. Rev.
408, 433-44 (2002).
56. See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S.
419 (1922); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S.
125 (1902); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
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relatively recent development that postdates the decisions in these
transboundary cases. Moreover, it is quite likely that if in fact one
were to apply modem standing requirements to these
transboundary suits, the States would have been able to establish
standing in each of these cases. Still, the absence of any discussion
in these cases that even sounds like the Court was considering a
standing requirement57 makes it substantially more difficult to
maintain that traditional standing notions should be turned on or
off depending on whether public officers are suing in the courts of
their own sovereign.
If my reconciliation of the cases is nevertheless accepted, it would
mean that the State AGs bringing Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Co. would be subject to the same standing limitations that
apply to private citizens suing in federal court. As the prior
discussion suggests, that would mean their action runs a high
degree of risk of being dismissed on standing grounds.
II. FEDERAL COMMON LAW
The second question I will consider is whether the AGs' public
nuisance claims can be brought under the federal common law of
nuisance. Let me explain preliminarily why this issue is critical.
The suit contains two counts, the first based on federal common
law, the second on state common law. Federal common law and
state common law are not cumulative causes of action, like
pleading breach of contract and negligence in suit against a
contractor. They are mutually exclusive. The public nuisance
action is either governed by federal common law or by state
common law, but not both. The Supreme Court said this explicitly
in Milwaukee II, the leading case. The Court chastised Illinois (the
plaintiff State) and the district court for saying that both federal
and state nuisance law applied to the case and said: "If state law can
be applied, there is no need for federal common law; if federal
common law exists, it is because state law cannot be used."
58
57. Although the labels used in contemporary standing disputes is of recent origin, the
concept that cases must be fit for judicial resolution is anything but new. See Thomas W.
Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative Law Decision, 37 John Marshall L.
Rev. 481, 489-92 (2004) (arguing that the first section of the Court's opinion in Marbuy v.
Madison is devoted to what today we would call standing); Woolhander & Nelson, supra note
33.
58. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 n.7 (1981). This proposition is
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The logic behind this is straightforward. "Federal common law"
on any conception, applies when important federal interests would
be frustrated by the application of state law."" Federal common law
is in effect a type of preemption of state law. When a court holds
that a matter is governed by federal common law, state law is
automatically preempted, and a federal rule of decision applies
instead. Consequently, if the AG's suit is governed by federal
common law, their state law count is a nullity.
However, if federal common law does not apply, because the
federal common law has been displaced by the Clean Air Act,60 then
the suit must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
over the federal common law count is based on the presence of a
federal question - the federal common law. Jurisdiction over the
state public nuisance count is based on supplemental jurisdiction.
If the federal common law count is dismissed before trial, then
there would no longer be any basis for jurisdiction over the state
count. Both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have
indicated that in these circumstances, the claim based on
supplemental jurisdiction should be dismissed.61
Before getting into the details of the federal common law
question, a little history is necessary to put this issue in context. As
already noted, the Supreme Court from the turn of the twentieth
century has adjudicated as part of its original jurisdiction suits
brought by States challenging transboundary pollution. The first
such case involved a suit by Missouri against Illinois for reversing
consistent with the later decision in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987),
where the Court held that state nuisance law could be applied to transboundary water
pollution. The action in International Paper was not brought by a sovereign state. Hence it
would not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and would not have
been subject to federal common law in the first place. Moreover, the holding that state
nuisance law survives in the transboundary context was based on saving clauses in the Clean
Water Act, preserving state nuisance actions from preemption. In effect, Congress,
legislating in an area of exclusive federal competence, determined that the preservation of
state common law was consistent with federal interests. The preservation of state common
law here is thus analogous to a congressional determination overriding the dormant
commerce clause and permitting state regulation of interstate commerce. See Prudential Ins
Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 426-27 (1946); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3-10, 15-16 (1975).
59. See Merrill, supra note 37 (discussing conditions that legitimately justify creation of
federal common law).
60. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2005)
61. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Keeling, 996 F.2d 1485, 1490 (2d Cir. 1993).
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the flow of the Chicago River and sending sewage down the
Mississippi toward St. Louis. Other suits have involved air
pollution along the Tennessee-Georgia border 63 and garbage
dumping and sewage dumping disputes between New York and
New Jersey. 4 The Supreme Court had to adopt some rule of
decision to decide these cases. The Court presumed that it. was
inappropriate to adopt the law of either the source state or the
affected state, since that would allow one of the litigants to adjust
the rules so as to win the case.65 So the Court drew on the general
law of nuisance without referring to the law of either state.
Although the Court did not use the term federal common law, this
was effectively what the Court fashioned and applied.6
In 1970, Illinois filed an original suit against Milwaukee,
Wisconsin in the Supreme Court.67 Attorney General Scott sought
an injunction against sewage overflows in Milwaukee, which were
allegedly polluting the beaches and water supplies in Illinois.8 In a
decision known as Milwaukee I, the Court confirmed that federal
common law would govern such a suit.69 However, since this was
not a State v. State suit where original jurisdiction is exclusive, but
rather a State v. City suit where Supreme Court original jurisdiction
is concurrent, the Court also decided that it would be better to
have the action tried in the federal district court.70 So the Court
remanded the case to be tried under the federal common law of
nuisance.7'
After an elaborate trial that imposed additional limits on
62. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
63. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236-38 (1907).
64. New York v, New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (sewage discharged by New Jersey into
upper New York Bay); New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 476-77 (1931) (garbage
dumped by New York City outside of New York Harbor).
65. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 Duke L.J. 931, 933,
939-46 (1997).
66. The creation of federal common law in this context can be justified on the grounds of
necessity. See Steven Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to Decide a Case, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev.
573. The court has jurisdiction and must decide the dispute; Congress has supplied no cause
of action; it would be improper to adopt the law or either of the litigating parties as a rule of
decision; hence the court must make up a rule of decision for the case on its own.
67. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-108 (1972).
68. Id. at 93.
69. Id. at 99-100.
70. Id. at 93-98.
71. Id. at 108.
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Milwaukee sewage overflows,72 the case returned to the Supreme
Court in 1981 and was reviewed again in a case called Milwaukee II.13
This time around, the Court held that the federal common law of
water pollution had been displaced by comprehensive amendments
to the Clean Water Act, adopted after the original suit was filed .
In light of this history, three questions have to be resolved in
deciding whether a federal common law cause of action exists in
Connecticut v. American Electric Power (1) Is a suit by States against
sources in other States challenging the emission of greenhouse
gases into the atmosphere the type of action that would be covered
by federal common law, absent the Clean Air Act? (2) What is the
standard for determining whether the Clean Air Act displaces
federal common law? (3) Under this standard, would the federal
common law be displaced in a suit challenging the emission of
greenhouse gases?
A. Does Federal Common Law Apply?
As to the first question - would the suit be governed by federal
common law absent the Clean Air Act - I think the best answer is
probably yes. Various arguments can be advanced for applying
federal common law in transboundary pollution cases. The
narrowest possible conception of the scope of federal common law
in this context is what can be called the "original jurisdiction"
theory. This theory posits that if the controversy is one that the
Supreme Court could hear under its original jurisdiction, and if the
Supreme Court would apply federal common law in such a case,
then the action should be governed by federal common law
whether it is adjudicated by the Supreme Court or by any other
court, state or federal.
The Supreme Court, as we have seen, applied a body of law we
would now call federal common law in original actions brought by
States challenging transboundary pollution.5  Once the Court
determined that the cases were proper subjects for adjudication
under its original jurisdiction, it had to apply some law. Congress
presumably could legislate a standard to apply in such cases, but it
72. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1979) (affirming in part
the relief granted by the district court).
73. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
74. Id. 316-32.
75. See supra note 44.
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had not acted. The Court conceivably could adopt the law of one
of the contesting States, but this would empower one the litigants
to manipulate the rule of decision and so defeat the goal of
impartial adjudication. Therefore, out of necessity, the Court was
forced to apply federal common law. If the Supreme Court would
apply federal common law in resolving such a case under its
original jurisdiction, the argument would go, then the lower courts
should also apply federal common law when asked to resolve such a
case. This is to avoid the injustice (not to mention temptation to
forum shopping) of allowing the law that applies to the controversy
to vary in accordance with the forum that decides it.76 Federal
common law should therefore apply whether the Court declines to
exercise original jurisdiction and remands to a district court, or the
parties do not ask the Court to exercise jurisdiction and go straight
to district court.
Under this original jurisdiction theory, if the Clean Air Act had
never been adopted, federal common law would apply to the global
warming suit. The Supreme Court has original but not exclusive
jurisdiction over suits between a State and citizens of another
State.77  Thus, if the Clean Air Act had never been enacted,
Connecticut et al. could have sought leave to file their action as an
original suit in the Supreme Court. Had they done so, federal
common law would presumably apply. Given that federal common
law would have applied to such a suit, the same law should apply to
the action when brought in federal district court.
There are other, broader conceptions of when federal common
law of nuisance should apply. Some have argued that it should
apply to any action where the source of pollution is in one state
and the affected party in another.78 Others have argued that it
should apply to any pollution of a resource that has important
interstate or federal implications. 79 These conceptions of the scope
of the federal common law of nuisance are more problematic than
the original jurisdiction theory. But it is unnecessary to consider
them, since the instant dispute appears to qualify as one that would
76. On the need to apply the same law in private suits as in original jurisdiction suits, see
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938); Cissna v.
Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289, 295 (1918).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (b) (3) (2005).
78. See, e.g., Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train 539 F.2d
1006 (4"' Cir. 1976).
79. See, e.g., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473 (7" Cir. 1982).
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be governed by federal common law under the narrowest
conception of the scope of that law.
B. The Standard for Determining Displacement of Federal
Common Law
The Supreme Court has never addressed the question whether
the federal common law of nuisance has been displaced in the
context of interstate air pollution. The lower court decisions that
have considered the question fairly uniformly conclude that the
federal common law has been displaced in this context.8°
Nevertheless, the issue is not foreclosed. The Second Circuit has
held that the federal common law is displaced to the extent the
Clean Air Act imposes a regulatory standard on a particular source
and the plaintiff seeks to apply a more stringent standard."' But the
Second Circuit has left open the question whether the federal
common law might survive with respect to a type of pollution not
regulated under the Act.
8 2
Unfortunately, Milwaukee II is ambiguous as to what the standard
for displacement of federal common law should be. The dispute
boils down to two different interpretations of that decision: did it
adopt a "field displacement" theory, or did it adopt a "conflict
displacement" theory? 3 The defendants will argue that Milwaukee
H/ adopts a theory of field displacement. On this reading, the
question is whether Congress has legislated comprehensively on
the subject of air pollution, with the result that it can be said that
the federal legislation "occupies the field." The AGs will want to
argue that Milwaukee II endorses a conflict displacement theory.
Here the relevant question would be whether Congress has
provided an effective regulatory mechanism for dealing with
greenhouse gas emissions, which mechanism provides a distinctly
different remedy than would be available under the federal
80. See, e.g., United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982) (holding that
the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law nuisance claims arising from air pollution
associated with operation of a waste disposal site); Reeger v. Mill Service, Inc., 593 F. Supp.
360 (D.C. Pa. 1984) (holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law nuisance
claims arising from air pollution related to operation of hazardous waste treatment facility).
81. New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 666 F. 2d 30, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1981).
82. Id. at 32.
83. These of course are alternative standards for determining when federal law prrempts
state law. I draw upon them here by analogy, in seeking to determine the standard for
determining when federal statutory law displaces federal common law.
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common law. 4
There is language in Milwaukee II to support either reading. On
the one hand, the Court repeatedly stressed the comprehensive
nature of the Clean Water Act amendments adopted after
Milwaukee I, and suggested that this new, more comprehensive
version of the Act occupied the field of federal regulation of
interstate pollution, to the exclusion of the common law.85 On the
other hand, there are passages that stress that the new legislation
specifically addressed the problem that the federal common law
remedy adopted by the lower courts was designed to rectify -
sewage overflows from a point source of water pollution subject to
the federal permitting process - implying that the federal common
law remedy was displaced because it conflicted with these statutory
mechanisms.8 6
84. A third approach, which straddles or obfuscates the distinction between field and
conflict displacement, would be to ask whether Congress has "spoken to" to the specific
subject of global climate change. Through diligent research one can discover that Congress
has from time to time authorized the gathering of information about climate change, or
studies of climate change. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7 4 03(g) (authorizing EPA to develop
"nonregulatory strategies" for several substances including C02); 15 U.S.C. § 2901
(establishing "national climate program" to improve understanding of global warming); 15
U.S.C. § § 2931-38 (establishing 10-year research program for global climate issues). These
nonregulatory responses, in my view, neither establish that Congress has occupied the field
nor that Congress has provided an alternative remedial mechanism for dealing with global
warming. They are arguably relevant in determining whether Congress has an "intent" to
permit C02 to be regulated as a criteria pollutant under the Clean Air Act. Cf. FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (reviewing multiple nonregulatory
enactments and information disclosure requirements to determine whether Congress
intended to give FDA authority to regulate tobacco products as a "drug" or "device"). But
they should not be used as a basis for determining whether federal common law has been
displaced.
85. For example: "Congress ... has occupied the field through the establishment of a
comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency." City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981). "Congress' intent in enacting the
Amendments was clearly to establish an all-encompassing program of water pollution
regulation.... The establishment of such a self-consciously comprehensive program by
Congress, which certainly did not exist when Illinois v. Milwaukee was decided, strongly
suggests that there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal
common law." Id. at 318-19.
86. For example: "[T]he problem of effluent limitations has been thoroughly addressed
through the administrative scheme established by Congress, as contemplated by Congress.
This being so there is no basis for a federal court to impose more stringent limitations than
those imposed under the regulatory regime by reference to federal common law, as the
District Court did in this case .... [The sewage overflows] are point source discharges and,
under the Act, are prohibited unless subject to a duly issued permit." Id. at 320. See also id. at
326 (stating that Federal Courts may not use federal common law to impose more stringent
standards "after permits have already been issued and permittees have been planning and
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Each of the two theories has a plausible rationale. The rationale
for field displacement might be that when Congress legislates
comprehensively, its silence on an issue should be construed to
mean that it left no gap to be filled with federal common law.
Silence in the midst of comprehensiveness instead means that
Congress intended to leave a subject unregulated, at least for the
time being. Thus, absent some affirmative signal from Congress
that courts should fill gaps with federal common law,
comprehensive legislation should not be supplemented by federal
common law.
The rationale for the conflict displacement theory might be that
when Congress legislates against the background understanding
that federal common law applies to certain kinds of disputes, and if
Congress does not specifically address that kind of dispute, it
should be presumed that Congress intended the federal common
law remedy to remain available. Public nuisance suits brought by
AGs challenging transboundary air pollution were understood to
be subject to federal common law before the Clean Air Act was
adopted.8' Hence, the failure to regulate a particular type of
transboundary pollution in the Air Act should be construed to
mean Congress would have wanted federal common law to
continue to apply.
Which reading of Milwaukee II is better - field displacement or
conflict displacement? This is a tough call, but for three reasons I
would incline toward the field displacement reading being the one
that courts are more likely to adopt.
First, Milwaukee II emphasized that the presumption against
preemption that applies when a court confronts a question about
whether state law is preempted does not apply when the question is
whether federal common law has been displaced by congressional
legislation.8s Instead, something of the opposite presumption is
appropriate: "'I[W]e start with the assumption' that it is for
Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the appropriate
standards to be applied as a matter of federal law."89 This shift in
the default rule is justified by the fact that preemption of state law
raises an issue of federalism: whether any branch of the federal
operating in reliance on them.").
87. See cases cited supra note 44.
88. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316.
89. Id. at 317.
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government is justified in supplanting state authority in a particular
area. Displacement of federal common law raises the same issues
of federalism, but also a separation of powers question, namely,
whether the Article III courts are permitted to establish rules of
decision in a particular area when Congress has not acted.
Displacement therefore presents issues of constitutional structure
that go beyond the issues implicated by preemption, and warrant a
special presumption against judicial lawmaking. 90 The field
displacement theory is more consistent with this presumption
against judicial lawmaking than is conflict displacement.
Second, shortly after Milwaukee II, in the Sea Clammers decision,
the Court restated its holding as follows: "[T] he federal common
law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely preempted by
the more comprehensive scope of the [Federal Water Pollution
Control Act]. ' This is just a line in a Supreme Court opinion. But
lower courts are likely to pay attention to it. It sounds more like
field displacement than conflict displacement to me.
Third, the recent history of the Clean Air Act suggests that,
insofar as multi-jurisdictional air pollution problems are
concerned, some type of decisive congressional intervention is
required before effective regulatory action will be taken against the
problem. In other words, congressional silence means, as a
practical matter, that the problem remains unregulated. Three
episodes in particular are consistent with this generalization.
The first involves acid rain. Acid rain was the great
transboundary pollution controversy of the 1970s. Northeastern
states were pitted against Midwestern states. Efforts were made to
get EPA to list acid rain as a criteria pollutant, and to restrict
emissions of precursor gases under the transboundary provisions of
the Clean Air Act.92 All these efforts failed, largely because of EPA's
90. The Constitution erects barriers to lawmaking by Congress in Article I, 7, which are
bypassed whenever federal courts take it upon themselves to make law based on a claim of
inherent authority. A rule permitting federal common law to coexist with enacted law would
therefore present the prospect of "too much law" relative to the amount of federal
lawmaking contemplated by the constitutional design. For further discussion, see Thomas
W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum.
L. Rev. 2097, 2145-47 (2004).
91. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981)
(emphasis added).
92. See, e.g., Thomas v. New York, 613 F.Supp. 1472 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd, 802 F.2d 1443
(decision - which would have required EPA to issue SIP revision notices pursuant to Clean
Air Act § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 7415, to reduce acid rain in Canada - reversed on procedural
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reluctance to take on an issue that intensely divided the States
without clear congressional guidance.93 Congress finally addressed
the problem with a comprehensive new regulatory program in the
1990 Amendments - a program that was superimposed on top of
the existing Clean Air Act mechanisms.94
The second episode involves depletion of the ozone layer of the
atmosphere by CFCs and halogen gases. This was a truly global
issue, since all agreed that the ozone layer was being attacked by
gases emitted from sources all around the world. As with acid rain,
the solution was not found by employing the existing provisions of
the Clean Air Act. Instead, the United States entered into the
Montreal Protocols,9" which called for rapid phaseout of CFCs and
halogens, and Congress implemented the agreement by enacting a
new regulatory program, again superimposed on the existing Clean
Air Act mechanisms, to achieve this phaseout among domestic
96American sources.
The third involves ground level ozone. A number of States along
the eastern seaboard have complained bitterly for years that their
ability to comply with National Ambient Air Quality Standards has
been comprised by ground level ozone wafting in from upwind
states to the west.97 Traditional mechanisms designed to provide
for consultation over interstate effects in drafting State
Implementations Plans did no good.98 Litigation did no good.
Then, in the 1990 amendments, Congress specifically ordered that
an interstate ozone transport region among the affected states be
grounds).
93. SeeJ. Wallace Malley, Acid Rain: A Decade of Footdragging May Be coming to an End, 91 W.
VA. L. REV. 817, 823-37 (1989) (discussing EPA reluctance to act on acid rain issue and
efforts to use Clean Air Act to control acid rain).
94. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 401-416, 104 Stat. 2468
(1990) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2005)).
95. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Sept. 16, 1987), 26
I.L.M. 1541, 1550-51 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
96. See42U.S.C. § 7671.
97. See, e.g., State of NewJersey, Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
626 F.2d 1038, 1041-1042, (D.C. Cir. 1980) (NewJersey, Maine, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, the District of Columbia, and the City of New York
challenged ozone non-attainment designations).
98. See New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 577-79 (approving EPA denial of eastern states'
Clean Air Act §126(b) petitions which claimed that out of state pollution sources were
preventing NAAQS attainment; also approving EPA's narrow construction of §126(b)). See
also Geoffrey Wilcox, New England and the Challenge of Interstate Ozone Pollution under the Clean
Air Act of 1990, 24 B. C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 13-26 (discussing the failure to control interstate
ozone pollution under the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Acts).
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established, and set deadlines for action. '9 Only then did we begin
to see some movement toward tackling the problem of
transboundary ozone.
In short, the recent historical experience is that nothing is likely
to get done about significant multijurisdictional air pollution
problems until Congress directs that something be done about it.
It does not follow, of course, that prior congressional action is a
normative precondition of such action. One cannot simply derive
an "ought" from an "is." But my guess is that courts will be strongly
motivated by pragmatics in trying to determine whether they
should assume the role of first mover in the campaign against
global warming. Recent history suggests that a congressional
blessing is required before effective regulation of
multijurisdictional pollution occurs. If courts understand this, they
will naturally be drawn to the field displacement theory, which
requires that Congress, rather than the courts, play the role of first
mover in controversial multijurisdictional disputes.
C. Application of the Displacement Standard to Climate Change
How should the displacement question be decided under these
competing readings of Milwaukee I? If the field displacement
theory is the better reading, as I have tentatively argued that it is,
then I think the federal common law count in the instant suit is
displaced. There is some suggestion in the case law that the Clean
Air Act is less "comprehensive" than the Clean Water Act.
Specifically, Judge Reinhardt, in a dissenting opinion in the Ninth
Circuit, has opined that the Clean Air Act does not
comprehensively regulate air pollution the same way the Clean
Water Act does, because the Air Act does not impose federal
emissions controls on all stationary sources of air pollution.00
Judge Reinhardt sometimes gets it right,'O° but not this time. It is
impossible to say that the Clean Air Act is less comprehensive than
99. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 184, 104 Stat. 2448 (1990)
(codified as 42 U.S.C. §7511c (2005)).
100. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Dep't of Water, 869 F.2d 1196, 1212-14 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Reinhardt dissenting).
101. Although he is perhaps the judge most frequently reversed by the Supreme Court.
REID ALAN Cox, T. MARSHALL MANSON, SAM BATKINS, CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
FOUNDATION, SUPREME SUPERVISION REQUIRED 14-16 (2004) (reporting that 53 decisions
Judge Reinhardt participated in were reversed between 1994 and 2004), available at
http://www.center forindividualfreedom.org/legal/ninth-study/ninthcircuitstudy.pdf.
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the Water Act based on pages of legislation or volumes of
regulations or economic activity affected or dollars of compliance
costs.'0 2 To be sure, the two acts have different regulatory strategies
- the Clean Air Act focusing on air quality and the Clean Water Act
on point sources - but I fail to see how this makes one
"comprehensive" and the other not.
Moreover, even if we grant the dubious premise that federal
regulation of point sources is required for comprehensiveness, the
Clean Air Act would have to be regarded as comprehensive, at least
as applied to the sources operated by the defendants in the case
under consideration. Under the 1970 version of the Clean Air Act,
all these sources operate under permits issued by state agencies
under federal guidelines, and the state plans are reviewed and
approved by EPA.10 3  After the 1977 amendments, these sources
must comply with federal new source review standards if they
qualify as new or modified sources, 1 4 and existing plants must
comply with Reasonably Available Control Technology standards if
they operate in areas out of compliance with National Ambient Air
Standards. 10 5  After the 1990 amendments, these sources must
obtain federal permits authorizing emissions of S02 and NOx if
they are regulated under the Acid Rain title of the Act.0 6 So if field
displacement is the test, the Clean Air Act occupies the field.
On the other hand, if the conflict displacement reading of
Milwaukee II is correct, then I think the federal common law count
in the instant case is most likely not displaced. The superficial way
of looking at the displacement question from this perspective
would be as follows: The Clean Air Act does not mandate
regulation of greenhouse gases; EPA has not elected to regulate
greenhouse gases; therefore, there is no conflict between the Act
and a federal district court judgment applying the federal common
102. The EPA estimates that Clean Air Act compliance costs were $523 billion between
1970 and 1990. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT, EPA, available at http://www.EPA.gov/air/sect812/design.html. A report
commissioned by the EPA estimates the Clean Water Act compliance costs were between
$77.6-96.1 billion for 1992-1997. GEORGE L. VAN HOUTVEN, SMITA B. BRUNNERMEIER, MARK
C. BUCKLEY, RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE, A RERTROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE COSTS OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACT 1972-1997 7-5 to 7-9 (Oct. 2000), available at
www.epa.gov/ost/economics/costs.pdf.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2005).
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2005).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c).
106. 42 U.S.C. §7651g.
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law of nuisance to order abatement of greenhouse gases.
There is a possible response to this. The States might have a
remedy against greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. They
could petition EPA for a rulemaking to list C02 as an air pollutant
that causes or contributes "to air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare" under Section
108 of the Act. 0 7 If EPA agrees, and lists C02 under Section 108,
then EPA would have a nondiscretionary duty to issue national
ambient air quality standards for C02 under Section 109.18 This in
turn would require all 50 States and the federal government to
revise their implementation plans to force sources to reduce
emissions of C02."°9 Among the sources so affected would be the
plants operated by the defendants in this case. So it would appear
that the Act contains a mechanism that addresses greenhouse gases
after all - at least potentially."
Unfortunately for the defendants - and happily for the AGs -
EPA may have foreclosed this line of argument. A legal opinion
issued by EPA General Counsel Robert E. Fabricant on August 28,
2003, concludes that EPA does not have authority to regulate C02
under the Clean Air Act because C02 does not fall within the Act's
definition of an air pollutant."' This legal opinion may be wrong.1
2
The Act is written so broadly that just about anything, including
water vapor, is an air pollutant." 3  But, the Fabricant Memo
obviously allows the AGs to argue that any attempt to petition EPA
107. 42 U.S.C. § 7408.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
110. Many of the same States that are plaintiffs in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.
petitioned EPA to institute a rulemaking listing C02 as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act.
EPA rejected the petition. EPA, Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003). The matter is now pending on judicial review. See Press Release,
Office of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, States, Cities, Environmental Groups Sue
Bush Administration on Global Warming, Challenge EPA's Refusal to Reduce Greenhouse
Gas Pollution (Oct. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/oct/oct23a_03.html.
111. Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, EPA General Counsel, to Marianne L.
Horinko, EPA Acting Administrator (Aug. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/airlinks/co2 petitiongcmemo8-28.pdf. See also EPA, Notice of Denial of
Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003) (adopting Fabricant's
reasoning).
112. See Nicholle Winters, Note, Carbon Dioxide: A Pollutant in the Air, But is the EPA Correct
that it is Not an "Air Pollutant"?, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1996 (2004).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 7602 (defining "air pollutant" in part to mean any "substance or
matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.").
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to list C02 as a criteria pollutant would be futile, because the
agency would be obliged to reject such a petition, given the
opinion of its general counsel that C02 is not an air pollutant.
With the listing option blocked, the AGs truly have no remedy
under the Clean Air Act. Hence there is no conflict between a
federal common law judgment and the Air Act. Hence the federal
common law is not displaced under a conflict displacement theory.
But let us backtrack and summarize. I have suggested three
principle conclusions: (1) federal common law would govern this
suit but for the Clean Air Act; (2) the most likely standard for
determining whether the Clean Air Act has displaced the federal
common law is whether it occupies the field of air pollution
regulation; (3) under this standard the Air Act is sufficiently
comprehensive that a public nuisance suit based on emissions of
gases from regulated stationary sources should be deemed to be
displaced. So, as to my second question - whether the federal
common law of nuisance applies in Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Co.-the answer most likely is that it does not. If I am right,
then the current suit should be dismissed, remitting the AGs to file
their action in one or more state courts under state public nuisance
law. Where, by the way, Supreme Court authority suggests they will
have to apply the public nuisance law of the source state - not their
own public nuisance law.
11 4
III. FOREIGN POLICY PREEMPTION
Global warming is a phenomenon that potentially affects all
nations. It will undoubtedly require concerted international effort
if an effective solution is to be found. Such an international
solution will require strenuous diplomatic efforts - the negotiation
of treaties, creation of multilateral institutions, development of
enforcement mechanisms. The third major issue raised by the
AGs' public nuisance action is whether such litigation will interfere
with efforts by the federal government to forge a diplomatic
solution to global warming, requiring that the suit be dismissed as
inconsistent with the exclusive assignment of foreign policy
functions to the political branches of the federal government.
114. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497-98 (1987) (finding that, while
Clean Water Act precluded Vermont from bringing suit under Vermont nuisance law, the
CWA saving clause preserves claims pursuant to the nuisance law of the source state).
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No claim can be made that global warming litigation is
prohibited by any treaty to which the United States is a party. Nor
can it be claimed that the suit is barred by an executive agreement
or even a statute of the United States. 15 Instead, the claim must be
that the suit is precluded by the theory of "dormant foreign affairs
preemption""5 - the notion that certain types of litigation are
foreclosed because they interfere with the conduct of foreign policy
by the President of the United States.
The argument, in capsule form, proceeds as follows. The United
States has ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 117 in which it has committed to cooperate with
other nations in seeking to develop collective solutions to global
climate change. The United States subsequently helped negotiate,
but then withdrew from, the Kyoto Protocol to this Convention. 18
The principal ground for the withdrawal was concern that the
Kyoto Protocol called for disproportionate reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions from developed countries such as the
United States, while demanding little or no sacrifice by developing
countries."9 The stated foreign policy of the President, in the wake
of the withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, is that the United States
is seeking to develop alternative collective solutions to global
warming that will distribute the burdens of collective action in a
manner that is more equitable than Kyoto.1
2
0
115. See David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to Global Warming: Is It Constitutional to Think
Globally and Act Locally ., 21 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 53, 79 (2003).
116. American Insurance Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 411 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
117. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
849 (1992).
118. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32. See also, Text of March 13, 2001 Letter from President Bush to
Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/ 20010314.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2005).
119. Text of March 13, 2001 Letter from President Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig,
and Roberts available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2005) ("I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of
the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance,
and would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy.").
120. See generally, President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change June 11, 2001 available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html (last visited Mar.
30, 2001) ("I am today committing the United States of America to work within the United
Nations framework and elsewhere to develop with our friends and allies and nations
throughout the world an effective and science-based response to the issue of global
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In this context, the argument would run, any judgment by a
United States court requiring that American firms reduce emissions
of greenhouse gases would interfere with ongoing efforts by the
President to negotiate a more equitable international framework
for dealing with global warming. Such ajudgment would require a
unilateral reduction in emissions by the United States, and would
therefore eliminate a "bargaining chip" that the United States can
employ in negotiations with other nations. Moreover, such a
judgment could embarrass the President by calling into question
his position that the emissions reductions required by Kyoto
represent a disproportionate burden that is unacceptable to the
people of the United States.
The argument that litigation can be preempted if it would
undermine the position of the United States in international
negotiations is not far-fetched. There are some sweeping
statements in Supreme Court opinions to the effect that the federal
government has exclusive authority to determine the foreign policy
of the United States, and that the President "is the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations.' ' 1. This exclusivity unquestionably
creates a zone of dormant foreign policy preemption that limits the
range of activity of States AGs. There is no question, for example,
that the State AGs would be prohibited from directly entering into
negotiations with foreign nations in an attempt to establish
reciprocal greenhouse gas emissions limitations.122
The leading decision that establishes the idea of dormant foreign
affairs preemption is Zschernig v. Miller. 1 3  The case involved an
Oregon statute that conditioned the right of an alien to inherit
property upon a finding by Oregon courts that the alien's own
warming.").
121. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936), quoting John
Marshall's statement to the House of Representatives of March 7, 1800. See also Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302, 38 S.Ct. 309, 311 (1918) ("The conduct of the
foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative-'the political'-departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.").
122. Such an effort might violate the Logan Act, adopted in 1799, 18 U.S.C. § 953. The
Act prohibits any citizen of the United States, without authority from the United States, from
entering into correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government "with intent to
influence the measures of conduct of any foreign government.. .in relation to any disputes
or controversies with the United States."
123. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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country would grant equivalent rights to American citizens. 24 The
Court concluded that the statute had been applied so as to affect
international relations "in a persistent and subtle way.""'
Specifically, Oregon courts had engaged in wide ranging factual
inquiries into the behavior of government in foreign nations,
including
whether aliens under their law have enforceable rights, whether the
so-called 'rights' are merely dispensations turning upon the whim or
caprice of government officials, whether the representation of
consuls, ambassadors, and other representatives of foreign nations is
credible or made in good faith, whether there is in the actual
administration in the particular foreign system of law any element of
confiscation."'
The Court concluded that the purpose of these inquiries was to
serve as an inducement to foreign nations to change their policies
to conform more closely to a particular model of government. In
effect, the Oregon courts were engaging in the conduct of foreign
policy, which was entrusted solely to the federal government, and
hence was preempted.
The forbidden judicial inquiry in Zschernig is distinguishable from
alleged interference posed by the global warming suit in terms of
whose behavior the court is being asked to scrutinize. In Zschernig,
state courts scrutinized the behavior of foreign actors, hoping to
influence the behavior of foreign regimes. In the global warming
suit, in contrast, the court is being asked to scrutinize the behavior
of domestic American power generators. There is no attempt to
affect the behavior of foreign regimes.
The defendants will argue, however, that this is a distinction
without a difference, because the global warming suit, if successful,
Would take away bargaining chips from the President in any future
negotiation with foreign regimes over global warming. The notion
that States may not impair foreign policy bargaining chips has been
endorsed by the Supreme Court in two recent cases. In Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council,12 7 the Court held that a Massachusetts
statute which sought to cut off state purchases from firms doing
business in Burma was preempted. Among the reasons cited in
support of this conclusion was that the Massachusetts statute
124. Id. at 430.
125. Id. at 440.
126. Id. at 434.
127. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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reduced the value of the "bargaining chip [s]" the President had to
offer in dealing with Burma under a federal program of economic
sanctions. 28 The fact that the state statute and the federal program
shared the same goal did not preserve the state law from
preemption, because the state statute interfered with the federal
calibration "about the right degree of pressure to deploy."129 As the
Court observed, "the President's maximum power to persuade rests
on his capacity to bargain for the benefits of access to the entire
national economy without exception for enclaves fenced off willy-
nilly by inconsistent political tactics."
130
More recently, in American Insurance Assn. v. Garamendi,131 the
Court again turned to the theme of interference with foreign policy
bargaining chips. At issue was a California statute that required
insurance companies doing business in that State to disclose a list
of policies previously issued by affiliated companies to holocaust
survivors. 32 The executive branch objected to the statute as
interfering with its efforts under executive agreements with
European governments to establish special funds for payment of
insurance claims to holocaust survivors.1 33 The Court held that the
California statute was preempted, noting that under that law, "the
President has less to offer and less economic and diplomatic
leverage as a consequence.' ' 4  As in Crosby, the statute was "an
obstacle to the success of the National government's chosen
'calibration of force' in dealing with the Europeans using a
voluntary approach." 135
Crosby and Garamendi provide the defendants with significant
ammunition for a dormant foreign affairs preemption argument.
Read for all they are worth, these decisions seem to say that when a
matter is under active negotiation between the United States and
one or more foreign nations, actions by individual States that would
have the effect of reducing the bargaining leverage of the United
States are preempted, because they interfere with the ability of the
Nation to speak with one voice in matters of foreign affairs.
128. Id. at 377.
129. Id. at 380.
130. Id. at 381.
131. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
132. 1& at 401.
133. Id. at 405-06.
134. Id. at 424 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
135. Id. at 425.
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The question then is whether there is any basis to conclude that
the bargaining chip theory should not apply in the context of the
global warming dispute. Three bases for distinction are likely to be
advanced.
First, the AGs can argue that the bargaining chip theory of Crosby
and Garamendi rests on traditional preemption principles rather
than dormant foreign policy preemption ala Zschernig. With
respect to Crosby, this is clearly correct. Crosby rests on traditional
statutory preemption grounds. Congress had enacted a statute
providing for federal economic sanctions against Burma shortly
after Massachusetts passed its legislation, 3 6 and the Court held that
the Massachusetts statute was preempted by this express federal
enactmentc 17 The Court therefore did not reach the Zschernig
question.1 38 In Garamendi, there was no federal legislation on which
to hang a traditional preemption argument.1 39  Probably for this
reason, the Court did invoke Zschernig as a source of authority for
its decision. Nevertheless, the opinion shied away from
characterizing its decision as resting on dormant foreign affairs
preemption. Instead, it focused on the perceived conflicts between
140the state statute and specific federal executive agreements,
suggesting that the state law was preempted by the executive
agreements,14  not because of Zschernig's dormant preemption
thesis.142 The AGs can therefore argue that the bargaining chip
argument applies only to cases involving traditional conflict
136. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 368 (2000).
137. Id. at 374 ("the state Act presents a sufficient obstacle to the full accomplishment of
Congress's objectives under the federal Act to find it preempted.").
138. Id. at 374 ("Because our conclusion that the state Act conflicts with federal law is
sufficient to affirm the judgment below, we decline to speak to field preemption as a
separate issue.., or the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.").
139. American Insurance Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 n.14 (2003).
140. Id. at 413 ("The principal argument for preemption made by petitioners and the
United States as amicus curiae is that HVIRA interferes with foreign policy of the Executive
Branch, as expressed principally in the executive agreements with Germany, Austria, and
France.").
141. Id. at 416 ("valid executive agreements are fit to preempt state law"); Id. at 417
("claim of preemption [left] to rest on asserted interference with the foreign policy those
[executive] agreements embody.").
142. Id. at 419-20 ("It is a fair question whether respect for the executive foreign
relations power requires a categorical choice between the contrasting theories of field and
conflict preemption evident in the Zschernig opinions, but the question requires no answer
here. For even on Justice Harlan's view, the likelihood that state legislation will produce
something more than incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the National
Government would require preemption of the state law.") .
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preemption by specific federal legislation, treaties, or executive
orders, and does not extend to pure Zschernig preemption.
Although the argument is technically consistent with the Court's
decisions, it is doubtful whether it will succeed. The Court's recent
foreign policy preemption cases seem less concerned with the
specific legal authority for preemption than with the general
proposition that States should not interfere with federal bargaining
chips. The Court has preferred to avoid relying on Zschernig in
developing this theory, because that case lacks a firm foundation in
positive law, rendering its legitimacy somewhat suspect. "' But as
Garamendi suggests, the Court is probably willing to invoke Zschernig
if there is no better source of authority to support a finding of
preemption, provided it is convinced such an outcome is otherwise
warranted to keep the States from meddling with federal
negotiations.
A second possible basis for distinction is the absence of a claim
based on state law. The Zschernig doctrine is framed in terms of
foreign policy being reserved uniquely to the federal government
rather than the States.1 45 The AGs assert that their suit is grounded
in a species of federal law - federal common law - not state law. If
they prevail in their claim, the suit will proceed in federal court,
not state court. Hence, the AGs can argue, there is no basis for
concern with state court interference with federal foreign policy
prerogatives.
The defendants might argue in rebuttal that the focus on state
law and state courts is something of an accident of history. The
doctrine could have been framed more broadly - in terms of
foreign policy being reserved to the political branches of the federal
government, thereby precluding meddling with foreign policy
bargaining chips by either federal or state courts. This alternative
143. Garamendi 539 U.S. at 439-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing reasons not to
apply the Zschernig doctrine and noting that "courts step out of their proper role when they
rely on no legislative or even executive text, but only on inference and implication, to
preempt state laws on foreign affairs grounds.").
144. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416-17 ("If the agreements here had expressly preempted
laws like HVIRA, the issue would be straightforward ... But... the agreements include no
preemption clause, and so leave their claim of preemption to rest on asserted interference
with the foreign policy those agreements embody. Reliance is placed on our decision in
Zschernig.").
145. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 436 (referring to "foreign affairs and international relations" as
"matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government"); id. at 441 ("If
there are to be such restraints, they must be provided by the Federal Government.").
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characterization makes sense, they could argue, given the
Constitution's explicit commitment of nearly all foreign policy
issues either to the President or Congress, 46 and the long tradition
that speaks of the President as the "sole organ" of the Nation in
dealing with foreign controversies.1
7
But the equation of federal and state courts for purposes of
Zschernig preemption is not quite right. Article III of the
Constitution contemplates that federal courts will exercise
authority to decide cases "affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls," and controversies "between a State, or the
citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.' ' 41 So
evidently the Framers envisioned the federal courts functioning as
appropriate tribunals resolving certain disputes involving the
Nation and foreign officials or nations. 49  Even with respect to
judicial examination and characterization of the behavior of
foreign regimes - the type of inquiry Zschernig saw as being
inappropriate for state courts - federal courts play a different role.
The Act of State doctrine, which calls for courts to refrain from
questioning official acts of foreign governments,1 50 is applied by
federal courts with a significant degree of deference to the views of
the State Department.'5' But the Supreme Court has declined to
give exclusive weight to executive views about when the doctrine
should or should not apply, reserving to federal courts a significant
degree of authority in exercising this delicate function.
15 2
Moreover, who is going to decide questions about preemption in
146. See e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("The conduct of
the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive
and legislative-'the political'-departments of the government").
147. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936), quoting John
Marshall's statement to the House of Representatives of March 7, 1800.
148. U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2.
149. See Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International
Tribunal: Reclaiming The Court's Original and Exclu.sive Jurisdiction Over Treaty-Based Suits by
Foreign States Against States, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1765 (2004).
150. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 ("The act of state doctrine in its
traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity
of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory").
151. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 124 S.Ct. 2240, 2255 ("should the State
Department choose to express its opinion on the implications of exercising jurisdiction over
particular petitioners in connection with their alleged conduct, that opinion might well be
entitled to deference as the considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question
of foreign policy."); id. at 2255 n.23 ("the Executive's views on questions within its area of
expertise merit greater deference").
152. SeeW.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
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the foreign policy context - whether under the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine or otherwise - if the federal courts are not available
to make these judgments? We need federal courts to serve as
umpires, deciding where the boundaries are between traditional
state functions and exclusive federal foreign policy authority. If we
decide that federal courts themselves lack decisional authority in
matters that implicate foreign affairs, this could circle back and call
into question their very authority to act as umpires. To be sure,
there is a theoretical difference between deciding a case on the
merits, under federal common law, and deciding whether state law
is preempted. But as we saw in Part II, federal common law itself
rests on a judgment about the need to preempt state law, so in
practice the two are inter-tangled. Thus, although the matter is not
entirely clear cut, there appears to be a sound basis for limiting
Zschernig- at least in its full blown form - to judicial applications of
state law.
A third possible distinction is grounded in intuitions about
territoriality. In each of the three decisions we have considered -
Zschernig, Crosby, and Garamendi - some State was taking action
designed to influence behavior outside the territorial sovereignty of
the United States. 1 53 This sort of undertaking is far afield from the
traditional authority of the States. The AGs' global warming suit, in
contrast, seeks to influence behavior by electric utility companies
inside the territorial sovereignty of the United States-an
undertaking close to the core of the States' traditional police
powers. It is true that the AGs' suit, if successful, would have some
effect on the bargaining leverage of the President in negotiating
with other nations over global warming. But if this were to become
a ground for preempting traditional exercises of state police power
within the territorial sovereignty of the United States, it is difficult
to see what the limiting principle would be. Virtually any
traditional police power concern could conceivably become the
subject of negotiations over an international treaty. If the mere
appearance of an issue on the international agenda would result in
153. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (Oregon statute provided for escheat unless
certain requirements were met including establishment of reciprocal rights for United States
citizens in the foreign country in question.); Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363 (2000) (Massachusetts law imposed economic sanctions on Burma.); American
Insurance Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (California law provided regulatory
sanctions to compel disclosure and payment on insurance policies for Holocaust survivors by
European governments and companies.).
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automatic preemption of state authority under the dormant
foreign affairs preemption, a good deal of the police powers of the
States would become at risk.
In sum, I think the dormant foreign policy preemption argument
should fail. A suit brought by legal officers of American States
against American defendants in an American court under a cause
of action based on American common law is not preempted simply
because a favorable outcome in the action might have
reverberations or ramifications for the conduct of American
foreign policy. The preemption argument should fail as long as
the case remains grounded in federal common law, because the
Zschernig doctrine is probably best understood as preempting only
applications of state law. If the federal common law claim is
displaced for the reasons given in Part II, and the case is not
dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction, then the dormant
foreign affairs preemption claim should still fail. This is because
the suit seeks only to adjudicate action within the territorial
sovereignty of the United States, and extending the dormant
foreign affairs preemption to claims that fall in this context would
have no obvious stopping point.
IV. THE STANDARD OF NUISANCE LIABILITY
Suppose we get by all these threshold issues about standing,
which law applies, and foreign affairs preemption. How is the
court actually going to decide this case? I am not concerned here
so much with how the court is going to resolve the daunting
scientific disputes about the probable magnitude of global
warming, the probable welfare effects of climate change (some bad,
some good), or the costs of different strategies to mitigate the
welfare effects. These difficulties are Herculean, so much so that
these they should be obvious to anyone. I am, rather, concerned
with a more basic question: What is the legal standard that the
court should apply in order to determine whether or not
greenhouse gases emanating from one State create an actionable
public nuisance in another State?
The standard legal research techniques do not get us very far in
answering this question. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a
public nuisance as "an unreasonable interference with a right
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common to the general public." 5 4 The key word here, obviously, is
"unreasonable." In circumstances where the defendants' conduct
is not "proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative
regulation" - that is, in the circumstances presented by the AGs'
public nuisance suit - the Restatement says that conduct is
unreasonable if it involves a "significant interference" with public
health, safety, or convenience. 5 5 This is not very helpful, since it is
unclear how severe an interference must be to qualify as
"significant," and we are not told whether only harms are to be
considered in determining significance or harms net of benefits.
The comments cross reference to the discussion of
unreasonableness in the context of a private nuisance. 156 Here, the
Restatement sets forth two tests. The primary test is a kind ofjudicial
cost-benefit analysis that asks whether "the gravity of the harm
outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct.',5 7 A secondary test
reflects a kind of strict liability, deeming conduct unreasonable
when it causes harm that is "serious" or "severe" and compensation
of all victims of the harm would be feasible. 58 Again, "serious" and
"severe" are not defined, and we are not told whether they are to
be measured in isolation or net of benefits.
In the end, the Restatement only frames the debate, rather than
providing any guidance in resolving it. Nuisance law generally - of
which public nuisance is a subpart - has long oscillated between a
"trespass" mode of analysis and a "cost-benefit" mode of analysis.159
Under the trespass mode, courts assume that invasions of a certain
type or degree of severity are automatically nuisances. Under the
cost benefit mode, courts attempt to weigh the harm to the plaintiff
against the benefits of the defendant's conduct, in order to
determine whether the challenged conduct should be deemed a
nuisance.
In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., it is predictable that
the AGs will rely on cases and commentary from the trespass mode,
while the defendants will invoke cases and commentary from the
cost-benefit mode. This is not because the trespass mode inevitably
154. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1977).
155. Id.
156. Id. at § 821B cmt e.
157. Id. at § 826(a).
158. Id. at § 826(b); 829A.
159. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va. L. Rev.
965 (2004).
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produces pro-plaintiff results; under this approach, some invasions
are deemed de minimus and result in no liability.16° Nor is it
because the cost-benefit mode is inevitably pro-defendant;
obviously, any conduct that creates external harms in excess of
external benefits can be a nuisance under this approach. Rather, it
is because the trespass approach assumes that nuisance law is about
enforcing "rights," which frames the inquiry in a way generally
favorable to plaintiffs. The cost-benefit approach, in contrast,
makes nuisance law seem more like a legislative or regulatory
proceeding, which calls into question whether nuisance disputes
should properly resolved by courts at all. In addition, the trespass
model proceeds rapidly from the complaint to liability to relief,
which is in the plaintiffs interest, while the cost-benefit approach is
likely to get bogged down in time-consuming discovery and
evidentiary presentations, which may favor the defendant.
Transboundary nuisance disputes offer a better way of
determining the applicable standard of liability, which I have called
the "golden rules" approach.' 61 Under this approach, the court
would determine the standard of liability by drawing upon a unique
feature of transboundary cases, which is that the contesting parties
are not only plaintiff and defendant, but are also members of
different political jurisdictions, each of which also functions as a
regulator of pollution controversies. This feature allows a court to
determine the applicable standard of liability by applying two
golden rules: do unto other States as you do to your own citizens,
and do not ask of other States what you do not ask of your own
citizens.162 In effect, the AGs could invoke either the regulatory law
of the States in which the defendant utilities operate or of their
own jurisdictions as a source of standards for holding the
defendants liable for greenhouse gas emissions. Similarly, the
utility defendants could cite either the internal practices of the AGs
States or of their own States as defenses to liability.
There are a variety ofjustifications for using these golden rules to
establish the standard of care for transboundary public nuisance
disputes. I will mention only two. 63 First, the golden rules cast the
160. See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8
j. Legal Stud. 49 (1979) (defending trespass model but acknowledging defenses like live-and-
let live and the locality rule that create exceptions to liability).
161. See Merrill, supra note 65.
162. Id. at 998.
163. For a more complete discussion, see Merrill, supra note 65 at 1011-13.
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court in a role it should be more comfortable playing. The court is
asked to investigate existing legal norms and practices of the
contesting parties and their home States in order to discover the
most closely applicable rule of decision. In contrast, under the
Restatement or either the trespass or cost-benefit model, the court is
required in effect to "legislate" a rule, based on its subjective
assessment of what is "reasonable," or its perceptions of the parties'
"rights," or its measurement of costs and benefits.
The discovery mode of decisionmaking should be especially
attractive to courts in highly controversial cases like the dispute
over global warming. If the court has to legislate a rule, based on
its own assessment of what is reasonable, or right, or consistent with
the balance of benefits and costs, it risks being accused of activism
and taking sides in a partisan controversy. But if the court can
decide the case by invoking one or more norms that the contesting
parties have agreed to impose on themselves, in their capacity as
domestic regulators, then it seems as if the court is doing nothing
more than requiring that States apply a principle of equal
treatment or nondiscrimination in their treatment of other States.
Second, the golden rules minimize the potential for using public
nuisance suits for strategic cost-exporting. Transboundary
pollution entails cost-exporting behavior. The source of the
pollution internalizes most of the benefits from the pollution-
generating activity, and exports some of the costs of the pollution
to the affected jurisdiction. But the regulation of transboundary
pollution can also entail cost-exporting behavior. If the pollution is
abated, the source of the pollution incurs most of the costs of
abatement, and the affected jurisdiction enjoys many of the
benefits. This danger of engaging in cost-exporting can be
minimized by adopting the decisional rules the contesting parties
and their States have adopted for domestic pollution disputes.
When faced with a pollution problem as a matter of internal
governance, a State must consider both the benefits and the costs
of abating the pollution. Thus, the norms the State has imposed
on its own sources will reflect a more candid appraisal of the costs
and benefits of regulation than can be obtained by litigating under
a norm of reasonableness, rights, or cost-benefit analysis.
The danger of cost-exporting behavior through litigation is also
nontrivial concern in the context of AGs global warming suit.
There is very little overlap between the plaintiff States and the
2005]
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States in which the defendant utilities operate. 6 4 The AGs are
therefore in the position of asking electric utilities in other States
to bear steep abatement costs that will produce benefits, in the
form of reduced risk of future global warming, which will be
enjoyed in large measure by plaintiffs' citizens. The golden rules
approach would head this off, by requiring that the AGs show that
their own States impose similar abatement duties on their own
utilities to minimize the risk of global warming, before they can
demand that such measures be taken by utilities in other States.
Under the golden rules approach to determine the standard of
public nuisance liability, it seems relatively clear that the AGs would
lose. Although a number of States have begun to take measures to
encourage reductions in C02 emissions," 5 no State, as far as I am
aware, has imposed mandatory reductions of C02 emissions on its
domestic electric utility industry, either as a matter of regulatory
law or public nuisance liability, in order to reduce the risk of global
climate change. Connecticut and the other plaintiff States are thus
guilty of asking of other States what they do not ask of their own
citizens. This is not a proper basis for establishing liability for
transboundary pollution.
CONCLUSION
The attempt to litigate global warming as a public nuisance in
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. presents a host of
challenging legal issues, only some of which have been explored
here. 166 As with many suits that seek to achieve wide-ranging social
and economic change, the plaintiffs must prevail against a variety
of defenses in order to obtain relief; if the defendants succeed on
only one, the plaintiffs are out of luck. My assessment of the issues
suggests that, however novel or difficult each one may be when
considered individually, the defendants are likely to find at least
one winning defense somewhere along the line. Global warming is
not going to be solved by public nuisance litigation. This only
164. Apparently, the overlap consists of only one power plant operated in Wisconsin, one
of the plaintiff States.
165. See Hodas, supra note 115 for examples.
166. Some of the other issues include whether the defendants are subject to personal
jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York, the standards for determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence, the standards for determining proof of causation, and the
type of relief that should appropriately be awarded if liability is established.
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makes it more important to redouble our efforts to consider what
form a realistic solution should take.
